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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2011, during the tumultuous debate over Ohio Senate Bill 5 (SB 5) and its
proposal to curtail Ohio’s pension funds, State Senator William Seitz was chairman
of the Senate Government and Oversight Committee. Seitz was a vocal critic of SB 5
and one of only six Republicans to vote against his party’s heavily-supported bill.1
SB 5 passed in the Ohio Senate by a vote of 17-16.2 For his part in opposing the
bill’s narrow success, Seitz was removed from his committee chairmanship by
Senate President Tom Neihaus.3 This was not the first time Seitz was removed from
a committee chairmanship for opposing SB 5. Earlier in 2011, “Niehaus took Seitz
off the Senate Insurance, Commerce and Labor Committee to make sure it would
approve SB 5. Niehaus replaced Seitz with a pro-SB 5 senator and the committee
voted 7-5 in favor of SB 5.”4 When Ohio General Assembly committee chairpersons
are stripped of their chairmanship, they not only lose their chair, but also the
supplemental salary tied to being a chairperson.5 So when Seitz was twice removed
as a committee chairman for voicing his concerns about a controversial piece of
legislation, he was stripped of what amounts to $6,500 in supplemental salary.6 Far
worse than the monetary loss for Senator Seitz, though, was the Senate President’s
ability to effectively silence the citizens of Ohio from voicing their concerns and
raising opposition to this controversial legislation through their elected
representative. Such unilateral action to suppress meaningful opposition in
1

Joe Guillen, Republican Senate Bill 5 Critic Removed from Committee Post, THE PLAIN
DEALER (Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2011/04/republican_
senate_bill_5_criti.html.
2

Id.

3

Id.

4

Id.

5

See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 101.27 (West 2013) (setting out the compensation structure
for the General Assembly and certain committee members).
6

See § 101.27(A)(4). Chairpersons of standing committees receive $6,500 annually in
supplemental compensation.
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committee voting has become commonplace in Ohio due to the structure of its
legislative committee system.
In the Ohio House and Senate, committee chairpersons and other select members
of legislative committees receive a supplemental salary, in addition to their base
legislator pay, for their service on the committee.7 The Ohio Constitution, however,
mandates that legislator pay be fixed by law (hereinafter “Fixed Compensation
Provision”) and that no changes to compensation take place during the term
(hereinafter “No Change Provision”).8 Because the Speaker of the House and the
Senate President have the power to discretionarily appoint and remove committee
chairpersons during the term,9 compensation necessarily changes during the term of
a removed chairperson. Such in-term changes violate the Ohio Constitution.10
Further, this compensation structure11 incentivizes committee chairpersons to
vote in lock-step with General Assembly leaders12 for fear of losing their
supplemental salary. Committee chairpersons must decide either to vote with the
leadership and keep their supplemental pay or oppose the leadership and be removed
from the chair. In each circumstance, the chairperson is deprived of the opportunity
to make an unbiased decision. As a result, power is centralized in the General
Assembly leaders. To limit this centralization of power, the committee compensation
7

Id. (setting out the supplemental salaries for the standing committees in the Ohio House
and Senate). Under § 101.27(A)(1), base salary for legislators was $60,584 in 2013.
8

OHIO CONST. art. II, § 31. “The members and officers of the general assembly shall
receive a fixed compensation, to be prescribed by law, and no other allowance or perquisites,
either in the payment of postage or otherwise; and no change in their compensation shall take
effect during their term of office.” Id.
9

Ohio House Rule 13.

The Speaker shall name all committees and subcommittees, and shall appoint all
members and chairmen thereto. The Speaker shall appoint members to a standing
committee so that its membership is proportional to the partisan composition of the
House. The chairman and the vice-chairman of the Finance and Appropriations
Committee shall not be included in making this calculation.
Id.
Ohio Senate Rule 20. “The President shall designate a chairperson and vice-chairperson
as well as a ranking minority member for each committee.” Id.
10

OHIO CONST. art. II, § 31. This article analyzes the constitutionality of the committee
chair compensation structure in terms of two distinct prohibitions contained in Article II,
Section 31. The first prohibition mandates that legislator compensation be fixed by law with
no other allowances or perquisites. The second prohibition forbids any changes to
compensation from taking effect during the legislator’s term in office. I argue that the
committee compensation structure violates both of these prohibitions. Although, should a
claim be brought under either of these arguments, the stronger argument is likely that the midterm removal of chairpersons violates the prohibition of in-term compensation changes.
11

For purposes of this article, the use of the term “committee compensation structure”
refers to the supplemental payments for certain committee members authorized under R.C. §
101.27, in combination with the House and Senate rules that allow General Assembly leaders
to discretionarily appoint and remove committee chairpersons.
12

This article uses the phrase “General Assembly leaders” to refer to the Speaker of the
House and the President of the Senate.
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structure should be declared unconstitutional for violating the constitutional mandate
that compensation be fixed with no changes during the term. Further, this Note
shows that the General Assembly leaders’ ability to control the salary of committee
chairpersons reduces independent thought and deliberation among legislators when
considering controversial legislation.
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part II of the Note discusses Article II, Section
31 of the Ohio Constitution and the structure of the Ohio General Assembly’s
committee system. Part II also discusses two cases that examined and explained the
provisions of Article II, Section 31.13 Part II examines Article II, Section 20, an
analogous constitutional provision to Article II, Section 31. Finally, Part II discusses
the introduction of the current committee chairperson compensation structure that
was codified in Ohio Revised Code section 101.27.
Part III of this Note argues that Ohio’s General Assembly committee
compensation structure is unconstitutional under Article II, Section 31 of the Ohio
Constitution. Part III also addresses the constitutionality of the committee
compensation system under a related constitutional provision, Article II, Section 20.
Part III further argues that the current compensation structure for committee
chairpersons improperly centralizes power in General Assembly leaders. Part IV
outlines a proposal that modifies committee chair compensation to limit the
influence of General Assembly leaders and satisfies Article II, Section 31. Part V
offers a conclusion to the Note that encourages Ohio citizens to demand change in
the General Assembly.
II. IDENTIFYING AND EXPLAINING THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR OHIO’S GENERAL
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE COMPENSATION SYSTEM
The Framers of the Ohio Constitution placed explicit limits on legislator
compensation. Article II, Section 31 of the Ohio Constitution states, “[t]he members
and officers of the general assembly shall receive a fixed compensation, to be
prescribed by law, and no other allowance or perquisites, either in the payment of
postage or otherwise; and no change in their compensation shall take effect during
their term of office.”14 No litigation has occurred regarding the constitutionality of
the committee compensation system. Ohio courts, however, have interpreted Article
II, Section 31 in constitutional challenges to state statutes that authorized travel
expenses and mileage reimbursement for legislators.15
A. Structure of the Ohio General Assembly
Like the majority of state legislatures, the Ohio General Assembly is composed
of the House of Representatives and the Senate,16 presided over by the Speaker of
the House and the President of the Senate, respectively.17 Each chamber is
13

State ex rel. Boyd v. Tracy, 190 N.E. 463 (Ohio 1934); State ex rel. Harbage v.
Ferguson, 36 N.E.2d 500 (Ohio Ct. App. 1941).
14

OHIO CONST. art. II, § 31.

15

See Boyd, 190 N.E. at 463 (Ohio 1934); Harbage, 36 N.E.2d at 500.

16

OHIO CONST. art. II § 1. “The legislative power of the state shall be vested in a General
Assembly consisting of a Senate and House of Representatives . . . .” Id.
17

OHIO CONST. art. II § 7.
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empowered to create its own rules.18 Both chambers used this power to establish the
committee system.19 Under these rules, the Speaker of the House and President of
the Senate (hereinafter “General Assembly leaders”) are empowered to name all
committees and subcommittees in their respective chambers, as well as the members
and chairpersons of those committees.20 Currently, the House maintains nineteen
standing committees,21 and the Senate maintains seventeen standing committees.22
Members of committees and subcommittees serve at the pleasure of the General
Assembly leaders and may be removed from their chair at any time.23
B. A Brief History and Purpose of Legislative Committees
The origin of legislative committees in the United States dates back to the first
years of Congress. During the formative years of Congress, both houses relied on
temporary select committees to establish rules of procedure.24 In 1789, the United
States House of Representatives temporarily established the Select Committee on
Rules.25The Select Committee on Rules, however, was not the first standing
The mode of organizing each House of the general assembly shall be prescribed by
law. Each House, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, shall choose its
own officers. The presiding officer in the Senate shall be designated as president of
the Senate and in the House of Representatives as speaker of the House of
Representatives. Each House shall determine its own rules of proceeding.
Id.
18

Id.

19

Ohio House Rule 13. “The Speaker shall name all committees and subcommittees, and
shall appoint all members and chairmen thereto.” Id.; Ohio Senate Rule 19. “At as early a date
as practicable after the organization of the Senate, the President of the Senate, by message,
shall name and appoint members to standing committees and any standing subcommittees.”
Id.
20
Ohio House Rule 13; Ohio Senate Rule 20 “The President shall designate a chairperson
and vice-chairperson as well as a ranking minority member for each committee.” Id.
21

The Ohio House of Representatives 130th General Assembly: Standing Committees,
THE OHIO HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.ohiohouse.gov/committee/standingcommittees (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).
22
The Ohio Senate 130th General Assembly: Senate Standing Committees, THE OHIO
SENATE, http://www.ohiosenate.gov/committee/senate-standing-committees (last visited Oct.
1, 2013).
23

Ohio House Rule 13; Ohio Senate Rule 20.

24

Senate Committees, Chapter 5-The Formative Years, UNITED STATES SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Committees.htm#5 (last visited
Feb. 4, 2014) (“Prior to 1816, the Senate relied on temporary select committees, the first of
which was appointed on April 7, 1789, to draw up Senate rules of procedure.”); Historical
Highlights: The Creation of the formal House Rules and the House Rules Committee,
ART,
ARCHIVES
UNITED
STATES
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES,
HISTORY,
http://history.house.gov/HistoricalHighlight/Detail/15032392020?ret=True (last visited Feb. 4,
2014).
25

Historical Highlights: The Creation of the formal House Rules and the House Rules
Committee, HISTORY, ART, ARCHIVES UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
http://history.house.gov/HistoricalHighlight/Detail/15032392020?ret=True (last visited Feb. 4,
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committee named in Congress. That honor belongs to the House Committee on
Ways and Means, established as a select committee on July 24, 1789 and named as a
standing committee in 1795.26 The Senate did not establish standing committees
until 1816, twenty-seven years after its formation.27 From that point forward, as the
size of the country rapidly grew, committees took on greater importance carrying out
the business of Congress.28
Today, legislative committees are the main avenue through which Congress and
state legislatures propose and enact legislation.29 Committee members play an
important role in setting policy directives, serving “as agenda-setters, determining to
a significant degree which issues Congress will consider.”30 The committee system
also “enables members to develop specialized knowledge of the matters under their
jurisdiction.”31 “Once an issue is placed on the agenda, committee members expend
time and resources drafting bills in markup sessions.”32
Committee members therefore find themselves on the front-line of proposing and
drafting the legislation that eventually makes its way to the floor for a vote. It is the
committee chairperson, however, who often plays the role of final arbiter for bills
coming out of committee.33 It is this power that prompted then-Professor Woodrow

2014)(“The Select Committee on Rules was the first—and arguably the most powerful—
select committee ever created by the House, but it did not become a permanent standing body
until 1880.”).
26

Historical Highlights, The Committee on Ways and Means, HISTORY, ART, ARCHIVES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.gov/HistoricalHighlight/
Detail/37061?ret=True (last visited on Feb. 4, 2014) (“The Committee on Ways and Means is
the oldest standing committee in the United States House of Representatives. Created as a
select committee in the 1st Congress (1789-1791) on this date, the Committee on Ways and
Means became a standing committee in the 4th Congress (1795-1797).”).
27

Senate Committees, Chapter 5-The Formative Years, UNITED STATES SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Committees.htm#5 (last visited
Feb. 4, 2014) (“During the second session of the Fourteenth Congress, meeting in December
1816, the Senate agreed to create eleven permanent standing committees . . .”).
28

Id. (“The significance of the change from temporary to permanent committees was
perhaps little realized at the time. But this was a decisive moment in the institution’s history.
The sheer mass and complexity of the Senate’s growing responsibilities demanded the
division of labor and specialization that a permanent committee system offered.”).
29

Id. “Committees are essential to the effective operation of legislative bodies.”

30

Brian D. Feinstein, Congressional Government Rebooted: Randomized Committee
Assignments and Legislative Capacity, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 139, 146 (2013).
31
Senate Committees, Chapter 5-The Formative Years, UNITED STATES SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/
briefing/Committees.htm#5 (last visited Feb. 4, 2014).
32

Feinstein, supra note 30, at 146.

33

See Michael Edmund O’Neill, A Legislative Scorecard for the United States Senate:
Evaluating Legislative Productivity, 36 J. LEGIS. 297, 299-300 (2010) (“A more junior
member who is nevertheless a prolific author of legislation may not see any of his bills moved
if he fails to command the ear of the appropriate committee chairman.”).
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Wilson to admonish committee chairmen as “committee barons.”34 The United
States House of Representatives has experienced waves of reform efforts to limit the
power of committee chairpersons, struggling to balance power between committee
chairs and the Speaker of the House.35As this Note will show, Ohio’s General
Assembly committee system skews the balance of power in favor of House and
Senate leadership once-and-for-all. As a result, Ohio’s legislative process suffers.
C. Cases interpreting Article II, Section 31
Though no court has examined this precise issue, courts have interpreted the
Ohio constitutional provision governing legislator pay. In State ex rel. Boyd v. Tracy,
the Ohio Supreme Court held unconstitutional a statute providing for the travel
expenses of legislators who attend special sessions of the General Assembly because
the statute violated Article II, Section 31.36 In reaching its holding, the court noted,
“[t]he General Assembly has full power to fix compensation for its members, but it
must be a fixed compensation, not an ephemeral one, but no change in their
compensation shall take effect during their term of office.”37 While the court
invalidated the statute, it did not clarify which provision of Article II, Section 31 the
statute violated—either the No Change provision or the Fixed Compensation
provision.38
Seven years after Boyd, an Ohio appeals court clarified Boyd’s holding. The
court found the Boyd statute was invalid because it was “in violation of that part of
the provision of Section 31, Article II, which states: ‘and no change in their
compensation shall take effect during their term of office.’”39 In that case, State ex
rel. Harbage v. Ferguson, the court upheld the constitutionality of a statute
34

WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 92
(1885).
35
Craig D. Margolis, House Out of Order: Committee Reform in the Modern House of
Representatives, 11 J.L. & POL. 273, 275 (1995). (“Ever since the development of the standing
committee system, the House has been marked by competition between the speaker and the
committees, and by fluctuating periods of centralization and fragmentation of political power.
The history of committee reform comprises a series of attempts to restore equilibrium when
either the speaker or the committees have gained undue influence over the people’s House.”).
36
State ex rel. Boyd v. Tracy, 190 N.E. 463 (Ohio 1934). The statute in question provided
$4 per day for legislators traveling to the State House for special meetings.
37

Id. at 466.

38
See OHIO CONST. art. II § 31. While the court was unclear as to which provision the
statute violated, the court did specifically consider the validity of the statute under both
clauses as respondent’s counsel argued against constitutionality of both clauses. The court
noted:

[c]ounsel for respondent insist that House Bill No. 4 is unconstitutional, for the reason
that, in effect, it either increases the compensation of the members of the Ninetieth
General Assembly, including the relator, during their terms of office, or grants to them
an ‘allowance’ for expenses, in direct violation of the provisions of section 31, article
II, of the Constitution of Ohio.
Boyd, 190 N.E. at 466.
39

State ex rel. Harbage v. Ferguson, 36 N.E.2d 500, 504 (Ohio Ct. App. 1941).
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providing for mileage reimbursement for legislators traveling to the State House.40
To reach its conclusion, the court reviewed the mileage reimbursement statute for
repugnancy to both the Fixed Compensation provision and the No Change provision
of Article II, Section 31.41 In the process of finding that mileage reimbursement is
not an unconstitutional allowance or perquisite, the court defined ‘perquisite’ as
“something gained from a place of employment over and above the ordinary salary
or fixed wages for services rendered; especially a fee allowed by law to an officer for
a specific service.”42
D. The Sister Provision: Article II, Section 20
The Ohio Constitution similarly restricts mid-term compensation changes for
elected state officials.43 Article II, Section 20 states, “The General Assembly, in
cases not provided for in this constitution, shall fix the term of office and the
compensation of all officers; but no change therein shall affect the salary of any
officer during his existing term, unless the office be abolished.”44 Given that this
provision applies to most elected officials45, the scope of this has been litigated
significantly more than its state legislature analog.46 The Ohio Supreme Court
considers Article II, Section 20 and Article II, Section 31 to be analogous, drawing
parallels between the two provisions.47
In Schultz v. Garrett, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld an in-term salary increase
for a clerk of a municipal court.48 In upholding the increase, the court stated,
40

Id. The statute “provided . . . a travel allowance of five cents per mile each way each
week to and from their homes, to be paid the member during the session of the body, and have
appropriated money for the payment of such traveling expenses.” Id. at 501.
41

Id. at 502-05.

42

Id. at 503.

43

OHIO CONST. art. II, § 20 (“The general assembly, in cases not provided for in this
constitution, shall fix the term of office and the compensation of all officers; but no change
therein shall affect the salary of any officer during his existing term, unless the office be
abolished.”).
44

Id.

45

See OHIO CONST. art. II, § 20. This section applies to all state officers not provided for in
other sections of the constitution. Accordingly, all municipal officials fall under the purview
of Article II, Section 20.
46
See, e.g., Schultz v. Garrett, 451 N.E.2d 794 (Ohio 1983); State ex rel. Edgecomb v.
Rosen, 279 N.E.2d 870 (Ohio 1972).
47

See State ex rel. Artmayer v. Bd. of Trs. of Delhi Twp., 330 N.E.2d 684, 686 (Ohio
1975) (citing State ex rel. Boyd v. Tracy, 190 N.E. 463, 468 (Ohio 1934). This case is
interpreting Article II, Section 20. (“‘[C]an the number of dollars payable to an incumbent of a
public office be increased by the enactment of a statute during his term of office?’ State, ex
rel. Boyd, v. Tracy (1934). That statement is equally applicable to cases arising under Section
20, Article II.’”)
48

Schultz, 451 N.E.2d at 796 (explaining that the municipal clerk’s salary was statutorily
fixed based on a percentage of county clerks’ salary, which was also statutorily fixed. When
the legislature amended the statute to allow for an increase in the county clerks’ salary, a
municipal clerk sued to have his salary increased based on the corresponding increase in
county clerk salary).
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When a statute setting forth the formula for the compensation of an
officer is effective before the commencement of the officer’s term, any
salary increase which results from a change in one of the factors used by
the statute to calculate the compensation is payable to the officer. Such an
increase is not in conflict with Section 20, Article II of the Constitution
when paid to the officer while in term.49
Schultz limits the constitutional prohibition to compensation changes that “are the
result of direct legislative action on the section(s) of the Revised Code which are the
basis of the officers’ salaries.”50
In State ex rel. Parsons v. Ferguson, however, the court invalidated the mid-term
commencement of health insurance payments for elected officials.51 There, the
legislature passed a statute allowing county commissioners to pay for county
employees’ health insurance premiums.52 Three years following the enactment of the
statute, the county commissioners of Madison County passed a resolution to pay for
employees’ health insurance,53 however, the resolution was passed seven days into
the plaintiffs’ terms.54 The court held that the payments were an impermissible midterm change in compensation.55
E. The Enactment of Ohio Revised Code Section 101.27
Following early constitutional challenges to legislator compensation, the General
Assembly codified its compensation structure in section 101.27.56 Under the statute,
legislators currently receive a base compensation of $60,584 per year.57 The statute
49

Id. at 797-98.

50

Id. (“Section 20, Article II of the Constitution forbids the granting of in-term salary
increases to officers when such changes are the result of direct legislative action on the
section(s) of the Revised Code which are the basis of the officers’ salaries.”).
51

State ex rel. Parsons v. Ferguson, 348 N.E.2d 692, 694 (Ohio 1976).

52

Id. at 693 (“R.C. 305.171, effective September 23, 1969, authorized boards of county
commissioners to pay for group medical and hospital plans for county officers and
employees.”).
53

Id. (“On January 8, 1973, the Board of Commissioners of Madison County adopted a
resolution appropriating funds to pay the premiums for such a plan. The first payment was
made on February 2, 1973.”).
54

Id. (“The appellants are the prosecuting attorney and the recorder of Madison County.
Both were elected for terms of office beginning on January 1, 1973.”).
55

Id. at 694.

Both appellants began their elective terms on January 1, 1973. Since the resolution of
the county commissioners authorizing the health insurance plan and approving the
payment of premiums was not adopted until January 8, 1973, seven days after the
commencement of appellants’ terms of office, the payments should not have been
made on their behalf.
Id.
56

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 101.27(A)(4) (West 2013).

57

A Guidebook for Ohio Legislators, OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMISSION 25 (2013),
http://www.lsc.state.oh.us/guidebook/chapter3.pdf.
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also provides that supplemental compensation be paid to legislators serving as
committee chairpersons as well as other select committee members.58 Currently, the
chairpersons of the Finance committees in both the House and Senate receive a
$10,000 supplemental payment,59 while the chairpersons of the remaining standing
committees receive supplemental payments of $6,500.60 The statute further provides
for supplemental payments to the chairpersons of subcommittees, the vicechairpersons of finance subcommittees, the ranking minority members of finance
committees, and the ranking minority members of standing committees.61No
member may receive more than one supplemental payment per term, however,
regardless of the number of committees or subcommittees they serve on.62
Today, a majority of legislators receive some form of supplemental
compensation for committee service.63 Of the ninety-nine members of the Ohio
58

§ 101.27(A)(4).

The chairperson of the finance committee of each house shall receive an additional
sum of ten thousand dollars annually. The chairperson of each standing committee of
each house other than the finance committee shall receive an additional sum of six
thousand five hundred dollars annually. The chairperson of each standing
subcommittee of a finance committee shall receive an additional sum of six thousand
five hundred dollars annually. The vice-chairperson of the finance committee of each
house shall receive an additional sum of five thousand five hundred dollars annually.
The ranking minority member of the finance committee of each house shall receive an
additional sum of six thousand five hundred dollars annually. The ranking minority
member of each standing subcommittee of a finance committee shall receive an
additional sum of five thousand dollars annually. The chairperson of each standing
subcommittee of each house other than a standing subcommittee of the finance
committee shall receive an additional sum of five thousand dollars annually. The vicechairperson and ranking minority member of each standing committee of each house
other than the finance committee shall each receive an additional sum of five thousand
dollars annually. Except for the ranking minority member of each standing
subcommittee of a finance committee, the ranking minority member of each standing
subcommittee of each house shall receive an additional sum of two thousand five
hundred dollars annually.
Id.
59

Id.

60

Id.

61

Id. Chairmen of non-finance subcommittees receive a $5,000 supplemental payment.
Chairmen of standing finance subcommittees receive $6,500. Finance committee vicechairmen receive $5,000. Ranking minority members of finance committees receive $6,500,
and $5,000 for finance subcommittees. Ranking minority members of standing committees
receive $2,500.
62

Id. No member may receive more than one additional sum for serving as chairperson,
vice-chairperson, or ranking minority member of a standing committee or standing
subcommittee, regardless of the number of standing committees or standing subcommittees on
which the member serves as chairperson, vice-chairperson, or ranking minority member.
63

The Ohio Senate 130th General Assembly: Senate Standing Committees,
http://www.ohiosenate.gov/Assets/CommitteeMembers/committee.pdf (last visited Oct. 1,
2013); The Ohio House of Representatives 130th General Assembly: Standing Committees,
http://www.ohiohouse.gov/committee/standing-committees (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).
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House, section 101.27(A)(4) authorizes supplemental payments for seventy-three
members.64 In the Senate, every member of the thirty-three member body has the
opportunity to receive supplemental compensation under section 101.27(A)(4).65
This was not always the case, however. Enacted in 1953, Ohio Revised Code section
101.27 originally provided only for the compensation of general members.66 The
statute did authorize supplemental payments for some members elected to leadership
roles, but not for members serving on committees.67 It was not until 1973 that the
legislature authorized supplemental compensation for committee chairpersons.68
F. Financial Persuasion: The Crack in the System
While General Assembly rules allow leaders to discretionarily replace
chairpersons, perhaps the most questionable exercise of this power involves the
removal of dissenting chairpersons. During the early 1990s, Vernal G. Riffe Jr.
served as the Speaker of the House. Speaker Riffe was a known proponent of such
removals. One newspaper noted, “[i]n the past, Riffe has removed Democrats from
committee chairmanships because they broke with the caucus position in floor
votes.”69 This practice has become well-established in both houses of the General
Assembly. During floor voting on the controversial 2011 bill to curtail collective
bargaining in Ohio, Senator Bill Seitz, one of only six republicans to vote against the
bill, was removed as chair of the Senate Government and Oversight Committee by
Senate President Tom Neihaus.70 Earlier that year, in prior committee voting on the
same bill, “Niehaus took Seitz off the Senate Insurance, Commerce and Labor
Committee to make sure it would approve SB 5. Niehaus replaced Seitz with a proSB 5 senator and the committee voted 7-5 in favor of SB 5.”71
Under section 101.27, all legislators are paid in equal monthly installments.72
These monthly installments include the pro-rated monthly installments of
64

The House currently maintains 19 standing committees, 7 Finance subcommittees, and
1 additional subcommittee. For each of the 19 standing committees, O.R.C. § 101.27
authorizes 3 committee members to receive supplemental compensation, totaling 57 members.
For each of the 7 Finance subcommittees, 2 members receive supplemental payments under
section 101.27, totaling 14 members. The remaining subcommittee has 2 members receiving
supplemental payments. Of the 99 members of the Ohio House, 73 members are authorized to
receive some form of supplemental payment. § 101.27(A)(4).
65
With 17 standing committees and 4 subcommittees, every member of the 33 member
Senate has the opportunity to receive supplemental compensation. Id.
66

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 101.27(A)(1) (HeinOnline through 1953).

67

Id.

68

H.B. 578, 110th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1953) (“Chairmen of all standing
committees of both houses and the majority and minority whips of the House of
Representatives and the minority whip of the senate shall receive an additional sum of seven
hundred and fifty dollars annually.”).
69
Lee Leonard, Session Canceled Over Bill, Not Speaking Fees, Says Riffe, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Sept. 30, 1993, available at 1993 WLNR 4985453.
70

See supra note 1.

71

Id.

72

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 101.27(A)(1) (West 2013). “Such salaries shall be paid in equal
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supplemental payments. When a committee chairperson or other recipient of
supplemental payments under section 101.27 is removed from his or her chair, the
monthly installments of the supplemental compensation cease the day the
chairperson is removed.73 So, when Senator Seitz was removed as chairman of the
Senate Government and Oversight Committee, his monthly compensation decreased
from $5,590.3174 to the base General Assembly payment of $5,048.64.75 Senator
Seitz is but one of many examples of dissenting chairpersons being removed to
further the leaders’ agenda.
III. OHIO’S COMMITTEE COMPENSATION STRUCTURE VIOLATES
ARTICLE II, SECTION 31
This Note argues that the Ohio General Assembly’s committee compensation
structure violates Article II, Section 31 of the Ohio Constitution. When a chairperson
is removed from his seat mid-term, he immediately loses his supplemental pay. As a
result, the mid-term removal of a chairperson causes an unconstitutional in-term
change in his compensation. Further, the committee compensation structure violates
the constitutional requirement that legislator pay be fixed with no allowances or
perquisites.76 Exacerbating the constitutionality issues, the committee compensation
structure inordinately centralizes power in the General Assembly leaders. To limit
this power, the committee compensation structure must be declared unconstitutional.
A. Constitutionality under Boyd and Ferguson
As discussed above, no Ohio cases have dealt with this specific issue.77 The
courts have, however, interpreted the constitutional provision in regards to statutes
authorizing payment for mileage reimbursement and travel expenses.78 These cases
establish key principals necessary to understand the limits of the constitutional
provision.

monthly installments during such term. All monthly payments shall be made on or before the
fifth day of each month.” Id.
73
Ohio House Rule 14(b) “The Speaker shall employ all employees of the House and shall
see that they satisfactorily perform their respective duties. All employees of the House are at
will employees, and shall serve at the pleasure of the Speaker. A terminated employee’s
compensation ceases on the day the termination takes effect.”; Ohio Senate Rule 20.
74

State Employee Salary Data, OHIO DEP’T OF ADMIN. SERVS. (April 23, 2011),
http://das.ohio.gov/Divisions/HumanResources/HRDOCBPolicy/StateEmployeeData/StateEm
ployeeSalaries.aspx.
75
State Employee Salary Data, OHIO DEP’T OF ADMIN. SERVS. (June 18, 2011),
http://das.ohio.gov/Divisions/HumanResources/HRDOCBPolicy/StateEmployeeData/StateEm
ployeeSalaries.aspx.
76

OHIO CONST. art. II, § 31. “The members and officers of the general assembly shall
receive a fixed compensation, to be prescribed by law, and no other allowance or perquisites .
. . shall take effect during their term.” Id.
77

See infra Section II.B.

78

See State ex rel. Boyd v. Tracy, 190 N.E.2d 463, 467 (Ohio 1934); State ex rel. Harbage
v. Ferguson, 36 N.E.2d 500 (Ohio Ct. App. 1941).
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1. Boyd’s simple guidance: No changes to compensation shall take place
A strict reading of Boyd renders this issue somewhat trivial. In that case, the
court held, “[t]he General Assembly has full power to fix compensation for its
members, but it must be a fixed compensation, not an ephemeral one, but no change
in their compensation shall take effect during their term of office.”79 Under a strict
textual reading of the constitutional provision, and bolstered by Boyd’s holding, any
mid-term change in compensation, regardless of the reason, violates the constitution.
Therefore, when a committee chairperson’s compensation is reduced as a result of
being removed as chair, such change in compensation takes effect during his term
and violates the constitution.
While Boyd more closely addressed the provision prohibiting mid-term change in
compensation, the case also illustrates how committee chair compensation fails the
Fixed Compensation provision.80 Taking section 101.27 in conjunction with House
Rule 13 and Senate Rule 20, committee compensation seems more “ephemeral” than
fixed. Section 101.27, on its face, fixes the compensation of all General Assembly
members and committee chairs. Alone the statute would likely survive a
constitutional challenge, but the General Assembly leaders’ powers under the rules
to discretionarily remove chairpersons leaves their compensation unpredictable and
potentially short-lived throughout their term.81 The statute’s effects must be
considered in the universe in which it operates. Here, that universe includes the
removal powers of the General Assembly leadership. Viewing the compensation
structure as a whole, mid-term salary adjustments run afoul of Boyd’s admonition of
ephemeral compensation.82
Boyd’s guidance only extends so far, though. The case dealt specifically with
compensation changes as a result of a statute enacted mid-term, rather than
compensation changes resulting from statutes and rules enacted prior to the start of
the term. Later, this Note discusses the effect that previously enacted statutes have
on the constitutionality of mid-term compensation changes of State officers under an
analogous constitutional provision, Article II, Section 20.
2. Failing the Fixed Compensation requirement under State ex rel. Harbage v.
Ferguson
The Ferguson case reexamined the constitutionality of statutes providing for
legislators’ travel expenses. Here, the court focused only on the Fixed Compensation
provision.83 This time, however, the court held that mileage reimbursement was not
an unconstitutional perquisite or allowance.84 Ferguson concluded that mileage
payments, though necessarily different for each member because of their varying
79

Boyd, 190 N.E.2d at 465.

80

Id. “[T]he General Assembly has full power to fix compensation for its members, but it
must be a fixed compensation, not an ephemeral one.” Id. at 466.
81

EPHEMERAL: That is in existence, power, favour, popularity, etc. for a short time only;
short lived; transitory 5 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 322 (2d ed. 1989).
82

This argument that the committee compensation structure violates the Fixed
Compensation structure is furthered in Part III.A.2.
83

Harbage, 36 N.E.2d at 503.

84

Id. at 506.
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distances from the state house, did not violate the Fixed Compensation provision
because the payments were “a part of the compensation” and not a perquisite or
allowance.85 The court reconciled the fact that the statute created differences in
compensation among members by stating,
the provision is of uniform operation as it appeals uniformly to all
members who are equidistant from Columbus . . . we may still preserve
the constitutionality of the act by holding that the provisions as to the
mileage is in fact a part of the compensation, and the fact that the final
payment to a member of the Legislature shall depend upon the distance
from which he may live to the seat of government does not render the act
unconstitutional.86
This holding seems to validate the current committee compensation system under
the Fixed Compensation requirement. Here, the statute and its supplemental
compensation apply uniformly to all members who are appointed to a section
101.27(A)(4)-compensated position, but any analogy to committee compensation
fails because Ferguson cannot reconcile the effect that House and Senate Rules have
on the fixed nature of the compensation.
Section 101.27 does not operate in a vacuum. Its effects on committee
compensation must be considered in the context of the entire General Assembly
committee system. When General Assembly leaders exercise their appointment and
removal powers87, compensation necessarily becomes non-uniform because of the
subjective nature of the leaders’ appointments and removals. Each member is
uniformly subject to the same possibility of appointment or removal, but the
subjective exercise of appointment and removal powers renders the committee
chairpersons’ compensation non-uniform as to each other. Such non-uniformity
leaves supplemental compensation looking more like unconstitutional allowances or
perquisites.
Ferguson’s uniformity requirement becomes clear when considering the
objectivity of the statute in question. In Ferguson, legislators who lived equidistant

85

Id.

86

Id.

If this provision gives a different compensation to the different members of the
Legislature, it may be difficult to say how it can be reconciled with constitutional
provisions. However, we are of the opinion that the provision is of uniform operation
as it appeals uniformly to all members who are equidistant from Columbus. In view of
the duty imposed upon us to sustain an act of the Legislature, where not hopelessly
repugnant to the Constitutional provisions, we arrive at the conclusion that if we were
wrong in our former statement that the mileage is but a reimbursement, we may still
preserve the constitutionality of the act by holding that the provisions as to the
mileage is in fact a part of the compensation, and the fact that the final payment to a
member of the Legislature shall depend upon the distance from which he may live to
the seat of government does not render the act unconstitutional.
Id.
87

See Ohio House Rule 13; Ohio Senate Rule 20. Both rules empower their respective
chamber leader to appoint and remove committee chairpersons at-will.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss1/13

14

2014]

SUPPLEMENTAL PAY OR SUPPLEMENTAL POWER?

283

from Columbus would be compensated the same under the statute.88 This allowed for
uniform compensation among the legislators based on an objective determination of
their distance from the Statehouse. Here, however, compensation under section
101.27 is determined subjectively based on the discretion of the General Assembly
leaders. For example, under Ferguson, two legislators who both live fifty miles from
the statehouse would each receive $2.50 per trip.89 Here, two committee
chairpersons appointed to standing committees at the same time would each
theoretically receive $6,500 in supplemental compensation throughout the year,90 but
Chairperson One may be removed three months into the job, while Chairperson Two
continues on to receive the full-year’s worth of supplemental compensation. The
subjective nature of determining which legislators will serve as chair and how long a
legislator will serve as chair necessarily means compensation is not fixed because
the statute cannot “appeal uniformly to all members.”91
This subjectivity engendered in the system by the General Assembly’s
procedural rules makes it is impossible to determine what a legislator’s total
compensation will be in a given year without first reading the minds of the General
Assembly leaders. Compensation cannot be uniform throughout the legislature, and
therefore cannot be fixed, if the calculation of that compensation cannot be
independently verified by each legislator. Without this ability to independently
calculate and verify compensation, it is impossible to know whether compensation
truly is fixed throughout the legislature. For example, the Ferguson statute allowed
for each member to independently calculate their total compensation for the year
simply by multiplying their distance in miles from the statehouse by the mileage
reimbursement value.92 Here, however, committee members cannot calculate their
total yearly compensation without first knowing what decisions the leadership will
make regarding their future on the committee. Ferguson’s broad definition of fixed
compensation is certainly not so broad as to include a compensation system that
requires extrasensory perception simply to determine whether legislators are being
uniformly compensated. Taken as a whole, the committee compensation structure
fails to fix the compensation of committee members in an objective and uniform
manner. Therefore, the compensation structure fails the fixed compensation standard
set out in Ferguson.

88

Harbage, 36 N.E.2d at 503.

89

Id. at 501. “Each member shall receive a travel allowance of five cents a mile each way
for mileage once a week during the session from and to his place of residence.” Id.
90

See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 101.27(A)(1) (West 2013).

91

See Harbage, 36 N.E.2d at 506.

92

Under the statute, legislators received five cents per mile traveled from their home to
the statehouse. With this information, each legislator could independently calculate his or her
total compensation. Though each legislator would likely end up with a different value for total
compensation based on their varying distances from Columbus, they would at least be able to
verify, by determining each other’s distance traveled, that no legislator received any
compensation above what the statute approved. This ensures that no legislator may receive an
allowance or perquisite for his or her service, falling outside the scope of the fixed
compensation provision. See id.
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3. Supplemental pay is an unconstitutional perquisite under Article II, Section 31
Further, Ferguson’s elaboration on the meaning of perquisite in Article II,
Section 31 places supplemental committee compensation squarely within the
perquisite prohibition. The court defined perquisites as “something gained from a
place of employment over and above the ordinary salary or fixed wages for services
rendered; especially a fee allowed by law to an officer for a specific service.”93
Considering that each member of the Senate currently receives supplemental pay
under section 101.27,94 it is hard to see how the additional pay is not a “profit . . .
secured by the officer out of the office he occupies in addition to his fixed
compensation.95 The vast number of committees and committee positions in the
Senate necessarily requires that each of the thirty-three members of the Senate serve
in one of the roles that receive supplemental compensation.96 Therefore, service in
such a role is an essential component of the general services required of a State
Senator. In the House, seventy-three members of the ninety-nine member chamber
receive supplemental payments.97 While section 101.27 may have once served the
purpose of compensating those who worked at a level above general members, the
vast expansion of the number of legislative committees, and the accompanying
increase in committee members, has obviated the need for additional payments for
those serving on committees. When the committee system necessarily requires
almost every member of the General Assembly to serve in supplemental
compensation positions, it seems hard to justify this compensation as payments for
services rendered above those required of general members. Rather, these payments
now represent compensation for simply doing what is required of a modern-day
General Assembly legislator. Committee supplemental compensation, then, “is
something gained . . . over and above the ordinary salary of fixed wages for services
rendered.”98 Certainly in the Senate, and likely in the House, supplemental
compensation violates the constitutional prohibition against perquisites.
B. Unconstitutionality under Article II, Section 20
The Ohio Supreme Court’s Article II, Section 20 jurisprudence lends significant
support to invalidating the committee compensation system under Article II, Section
31. In Schultz v. Garrett, the court upheld an in-term compensation change for a
93
Harbage, 36 N.E.2d at 503 (The court made an initial finding that the mileage payments
were not prerequisites, as the payments merely reimbursed members for their actual
expenses).
94

The Ohio Senate 130th General Assembly: Senate Standing Committees’ Members,
THE OHIO SENATE, http://www.ohiosenate.gov/Assets/CommitteeMembers/committee.pdf
(last visited Oct. 1, 2013); § 101.27(A)(4).
95

Harbage, 36 N.E.2d at 503. “All the definitions contemplate a profit to be secured by
the officer out of the office he occupies in addition to his fixed compensation.” Id.
96

Given that there are only thirty-three members of the Senate and seventeen standing
committees, and that the statute authorizes supplemental compensation for committee chairs,
ranking minority members, and subcommittee chairmen; each member serves in at least one
of the roles that receives supplemental compensation. See § 101.27(A)(4).
97

See supra note 64 and accompanying text.

98

Harbage, 36 N.E.2d at 503.
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municipal clerk of court because the change was the result of legislative action
affecting a factor of the compensation formula used to determine the clerk’s salary.99
In State ex rel. Parsons v. Ferguson, the court invalidated an in-term compensation
increase that resulted from three county commissioners’ decision, based on a
previously-enacted statute, to provide for additional compensation for employees in
the form of health insurance premiums.100 In these cases, the distinction can be
drawn in terms of how the compensation change comes to take effect. When
compensation changes as the result of the legislature enacting or amending a statute
that is a part of the overall formula of the compensation statute101 in question, the
compensation increase is valid.102 Where the legislature has already enacted the
relevant compensation statute, however, and an authorized official later takes action
under that statute to increase compensation mid-term, the change is invalid.103
Mid-term changes to committee members’ compensation falls squarely within
the latter category of prohibited compensation changes. Section 101.27 is currently
enacted and authorizes certain committee members to receive additional
compensation.104 The General Assembly leaders then take action under the statute
and the chamber rules to appoint the relevant committee members. Such
appointments result in mid-term compensation changes for the appointed committee
99

Schultz v. Garrett, 451 N.E.2d 794 (Ohio 1983).

When a statute setting forth the formula for the compensation of an officer is effective
before the commencement of the officer’s term, any salary increase which results
from a change in one of the factors used by the statute to calculate the compensation is
payable to the officer. Such increase is not in conflict with Section 20, Article II of the
Constitution when paid to the officer while in term.
Id. at 797-98.
100

State ex rel. Parsons v. Ferguson, 348 N.E.2d 692, 694 (Ohio 1976).

Both appellants began their elective terms on January 1, 1973. Since the resolution of
the county commissioners authorizing the health insurance plan and approving the
payment of premiums was not adopted until January 8, 1973, seven days after the
commencement of appellants’ terms of office, the payments should not have been
made on their behalf.
Id.
101
For purposes of this article, “compensation statute” refers to the relevant statute that
authorizes the compensation being challenged. For example, in State ex rel. Parsons v.
Ferguson, the “compensation statute” is OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 305.171 (West 2013).
102

See Schultz, 451 N.E.2d at 796.

103

See Parsons, 348 N.E.2d at 694. “R.C. 305.171, effective September 23, 1969,
authorized boards of county commissioners to pay for group medical and hospital plans for
county officers and employees. On January 8, 1973, the Board of Commissioners of Madison
County adopted a resolution appropriating funds to pay the premiums for such a plan.” Id. The
court held that the payments made on January 8, 1973, seven days into the petitioners’ terms,
resulted in unconstitutional mid-term changes in compensation. Note here, that the County
Commissioners were authorized by statute to make these payments prior to the decision to
issue the payments. But the Commissioners’ actions under the statute to make the payments
mid-term resulted in unconstitutional mid-term changes in salary. Id. at 693.
104

See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 101.27(A)(4) (West 2013).
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members. The increased compensation does not result “from a change in one of the
factors used by the statute to calculate the compensation.”105 Indeed, the only factor
used to determine committee compensation is section 101.27. The decision to
appoint and remove committee members changes nothing about the statute itself.
Rather, like in Parsons, the increased compensation is the result of direct action by
those authorized under section 101.27 to affect compensation. Therefore, under
Parsons, these compensation changes, though authorized under section 101.27,
result in an unconstitutional in-term change in compensation.
C. The current system must change to increase independent representation and
deliberative democracy in the General Assembly
Much debate surrounds the appropriate level of committee involvement in
legislatures and the efficacy of procedural rules in our representative form of
government. Woodrow Wilson once said of the congressional committee system, “I
know not how better to describe our form of government in a single phrase than by
calling it a government by the chairmen of the Standing Committees of Congress.”106
Congressman Gerald B.H. Solomon characterized Congress’ procedural rules and its
committee system as restricting deliberative democracy.107 Congressman Solomon
defined deliberative democracy as “an ideal representative, or republican, form of
government. True deliberative democracy allows the full and free airing of
conflicting opinions and ideas on legislative policies through hearings, debates, and
amendments.”108 Former House Speaker Sam Rayburn described the concept of
deliberative democracy specifically in the context of Congress: “It is in the Congress
that the varied needs and interests of the people find expression. It is in the Congress
that out of the clash of contending opinions is forged the democratic unity of a
democratic people.”109 Over the course of time, as the nation and our government
increased in size, new procedurals rules were instituted in Congress to address the
problems that come with greater membership.110 These rules, however, brought with

105

Schultz v. Garrett, 451 N.E.2d 794, 796 (Ohio 1983).

106

WILSON, supra note 34, at 82. Wilson was one of the most outspoken critics of the
committee system. Wilson once said of the comparison between the House and its
committees:
The House sits, not for serious discussion, but to sanction the conclusions of its
Committees as rapidly as possible. It legislates in its committee-rooms; not by the
determinations of majorities, but by the resolutions of specially-commissioned
minorities; so that it is not far from the truth to say that Congress in session is
congress on public exhibition, while Congress in its committee-room is Congress at
work.
Id.
107

Congressman Gerald B.H. Solomon & Donald R. Wolfensberger, The Decline of
Deliberative Democracy in the House and Proposals For Reform, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 321
(1994).
108

Id. at 323.

109

Id.

110

See id. at 328-29.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss1/13

18

2014]

SUPPLEMENTAL PAY OR SUPPLEMENTAL POWER?

287

them the adverse effect of reducing meaningful debate and compromise in
Congress.111
1. The leadership’s control over supplemental compensation suppresses dissenting
opinions of committee members.
The Ohio General Assembly’s unique procedural rules serve only to exacerbate
the well-established problems that plague the United States Congress. In particular,
the rule that allows General Assembly leaders to discretionarily appoint and remove
committee chairpersons most undermines the principles of deliberative democracy
and representative leadership. Under Ohio’s framework, committee chairpersons are
beholden to the leadership because the leadership can take away the chair as quickly
as they gave it. Chairpersons are cognizant of the fact that the leadership need not
offer a reason for removing them from the chair. As such, Chairpersons must
constantly balance the possibility of being removed from their chair as a result of
voting opposite the leadership against their own personal beliefs about what would
be best for the citizens of Ohio. While a chairperson may fervently disagree with the
leadership’s position on a given piece of legislation, he may nevertheless decide to
vote with the leadership on that matter because he may believe he can better serve
his constituents in future matters by keeping his chair rather than fighting the
leadership and being removed.112 Chairpersons must essentially adopt a “live to fight
another day” mentality.
The end result is a system where each house’s leader wields immense power over
the topics of debate and, indeed, the debate itself. Congressman Solomon noted that,
(substituting Ohio’s committee system for congress), “Rather than providing for the
free exchange of conflicting opinions, resulting in an improved legislative product,
[Ohio’s committee system] now serve[s] to restrict debate rather than enhance it.”113
When committee chairpersons cannot confidently raise arguments against legislation
set out by the leadership, there is no chance for the legislation to be improved
through any meaningful discussion or debate. What we are left with is legislation
that was not properly vetted through the very committees that were designed to
carefully consider and debate bills in an effort to improve that legislation. Dissenting
opinions are an essential part of a well-functioning democracy.114 Procedural rules
that serve to restrict dissent and debate therefore serve only to delude the
effectiveness of democracy.
111

Id. at 321.

112

A cynical observer may believe that chairpersons will not vote against the leadership in
such situations because the legislator is afraid of losing political power by being removed as
chair. While I do not fully endorse this belief, there is certainly a possibility that political
maneuverings play a role in the voting strategy of many committee chairpersons.
113

Solomon & Wolfensberger, supra note 107, at 321-22.

114

See id. at 323.

It is out of the airing of conflicting opinions in hearings, debates, and conferences that
a people’s Congress comes to decisions that command the respect of a free and
democratic people. Not all measures which emerge from the Congress are perfect, not
by any means, but there are very few which are not improved as a result of discussion,
debate, and amendment.
Id.
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Further, Ohio’s electorate is ill-served by allowing one person to quash any
dissent by committee chairs and members. Our form of representative government
requires that the constituency be able to rely on their chosen representatives to offer
full-throated defenses of the interests of the people who elected them. When elected
representatives are hand-cuffed from making objections to legislation that may affect
their constituents, the system fails to offer the best method for operating a
government.
Compare all of this with Congress, where chairpersons are elected by party
caucuses, and thus are beholden to no one individual.115 As a result, Congressional
committee chairs are free to vote against or openly question Congressional
leadership if the chair disagrees with a given bill. Dissenting chairs need not worry
that the Speaker will remove them, for they have the protection of like-minded
legislators who would fight, in the form of their vote, to keep the chairperson from
being removed. While by no means the model that Ohio should strive to be,
Congress’s committee system offers a better opportunity to realize James Madison’s
description of the ideal representative government: “[T]o refine and enlarge the
public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens,
whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country and whose
patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial
considerations.”116
2. The committee system is rife with improper influence over committee members
Alone, the centralization of power in General Assembly leadership is enough to
call for a change to Ohio’s committee system, but the leaders’ power is even greater
because of the influence they wield over the chairperson’s salary. Rather than
serving the best interests of their constituents, committee chairpersons are pressured
to appease the leadership at threat of losing their chair and financial livelihood along
with it. Take, for example, the chairperson of the House Finance Committee. Under
section 101.27, the finance chair receives $10,000 in supplemental compensation.117
This $10,000 represents a 16.5% increase in salary for the finance chair.118 With
supplemental compensation forming a substantial percentage of her overall salary,
the finance chair is pressured into appeasing the Speaker of the House at risk of
being removed and suffering a substantial decrease in income. This system
115
Ohio House Rule 10.5(a)(1). “The standing committees specified in clause 1 shall be
elected by the House within seven calendar days after the commencement of each Congress,
from nominations submitted by the respective party caucus or conference.”); Ohio Senate
Rule 24.1

In the appointment of the standing committees, or to fill vacancies thereon, the Senate,
unless otherwise ordered, shall by resolution appoint the chairman of each such
committee and the other members thereof. On demand of any Senator, a separate vote
shall be had on the appointment of the chairman of any such committee and on the
appointment of the other members thereof.
Id.
116

THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).

117

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 101.27(A)(4) (West 2013).

118

See id. At a base legislative salary of $60,584, an additional $10,000 dollars represents
an increase of 16.51% over top of the base salary.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss1/13

20

2014]

SUPPLEMENTAL PAY OR SUPPLEMENTAL POWER?

289

inevitably creates an employer-employee relationship between the finance chair and
the Speaker of the House. Because of the Speaker’s removal powers, the ultimate
decision of what legislation comes out of the finance committee rests with the
Speaker rather than the chairperson. If the Speaker learns that the chair plans to vote
opposite of how the Speakers wants her to vote, the Speaker simply removes the
chair and replaces her with someone who will vote according to the Speaker’s
wishes.119 This causes the finance chair to constantly consider how the Speaker
would have her vote in a given situation, for failure to do so may prove to be a
costly, $10,000 decision. As a result, the Speaker assumes what is essentially the
role of the boss, having a disproportionately large voice in how the very influential
finance committee is operated.
Representative government requires legislators to be first and foremost
accountable to the citizens who elected them.120 Conditioning a legislator’s overall
compensation on one General Assembly leader’s satisfaction with his or her voting
record creates an improper motivation for legislators to appease the leadership rather
than the constituents. The deleterious effect on Ohio’s democracy caused by the
current committee compensation system is comparable to the many problems of
campaign finance and lobbying.121 For campaign finance, the concern has long been
the presence of political quid pro quo. In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court
recognized the effect that large donations can have in a representative democracy,
stating, “[t]o the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid
pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of
representative democracy is undermined.”122 Similar concerns are often raised in
regards to lobbying. “In cases dating back to the nineteenth century, the Court has
expressed concern about the corrupting effects of ‘the influence and exertions of the
lobby agent to bring about the passage of a law.’”123
It is no long stretch to see that the problems raised by both campaign finance and
lobbying are present in Ohio’s committee compensation system. Sitting committee
119

For a real life example, refer to Senator Bill Seitz’s removal from his chairmanship
during committee debate over Senate Bill 5 in 2011. Seitz was a vocal critic of the bill, and
represented the swing vote for whether the bill would make it out of committee. Rather than
allowing Seitz to vote, Speaker William Batchelder, a proponent of the bill, removed Seitz
from his chair and replaced him with a pro-Senate Bill 5 senator. The bill then passed through
the committee with a 7-5 vote. See Guillen, supra note 1.
120

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison).

The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men
who possess the most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue the common good
of the society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping
them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust.
Id.
121

See Richard Briffault, Lobbying and Campaign Finance: Separate and Together, 19
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 105, 108 (2008). “Campaign finance and lobbying also raise concerns
about improper influence, or corruption, that is, the danger that government officials will
make decisions based on their own private benefit – whether to aid their reelection efforts or
to add to their personal wealth – rather than the public interest.” Id.
122

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976).

123

Briffault, supra note 121, at 108 (citing Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. 441, 451 (1874)).
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chairs can keep their supplemental compensation, and new legislators may be
appointed to a chairmanship, so long as they agree to vote in lock-step with the
leadership—the quintessential quid pro quo. The General Assembly leadership
essentially act as lobbyists, influencing committee members’ votes with threats of
removal or promises of a promotion to the chair. The presence of improper influence
in campaign finance and lobbying was enough for the federal government to step in
and heavily regulate these areas.124 So too should Ohio move to cure the improper
influences plaguing its committee compensation system.
3. Improper influence through financial persuasion can never be too small
A possible argument could be made that the amount of money at stake for a
removed committee member is not enough to entice a reasonable legislator into
changing his or her vote, but this argument misses the point. Our form of
representative government is dependent upon trust between the constituency and
those they choose to represent them.125 Any incentive, no matter how small, for a
representative to serve the interests of any party other than the general public creates
a chink in the armor of our republican government. If even one legislator has been
influenced to vote opposite his convictions for fear of losing his supplemental
compensation, then this compensation system has served to undermine the integrity
of Ohio’s representative democracy.
Further, while there may not always be a large amount of money at stake for
legislators facing removal, it is inappropriate to leave this system in place simply
because the majority of legislators may not be fazed by losing a couple of thousand
dollars from their salary. A republican government is built on the precept that those
most willing and capable of serving the people have the opportunity to do so, not just
those who are most financially able.126 By conditioning overall compensation of
committee members on the approval of the General Assembly leaders, legislators of
more modest means will invariably feel the greatest pressure to appease the
leadership, for these legislators will more greatly feel the effects of the loss of
supplemental compensation.127 Such legislators’ voices are effectively stifled,
124

Id. “Both campaign finance and lobbying are also regulated not simply because of the
possibility of actual corruption but because of the potentially demoralizing effects on public
confidence in government of the ‘appearance of corruption’ attributable to unrestricted
contributions or the ‘direct access to elected representatives’ enjoyed by lobbyists.” Id.
(citations omitted).
125

George A. Nation III, We the People: The Consent of the Governed in the Twenty-First
Century: The People’s Unalienable Right to Make Law, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 319, 329 (2012).
“The very heart of a representative democracy is the accountability of elected politicians to
the voters.” Id.
126

THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).

In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens
in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates
to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried and,
the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to center in men who
possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters.
Id.
127
Consider a legislator in the Ohio House who serves as chair of the Finance Committee.
The legislator’s overall compensation is $70,584 ($60,584 in base salary, and $10,000 in
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allowing the leadership to push through bills without any meaningful consideration
or debate. Overall, Ohio’s system works to undermine the principles of American
government; “that the two houses should serve as forums for the free exchange of
ideas and proposals, producing legislation that reflects the will of the people and
accomplishes important goals.”128
IV. PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
Ohio’s committee compensation structure must change. Not only does it violate
the Ohio Constitution, but the compensation structure also reduces the free-flow of
ideas and restricts meaningful debate. To resolve these issues, I propose that section
101.27(A)(4) be amended to eliminate supplemental payments for committee
members. Further, I propose that the General Assembly rules be amended to allow
each chamber to approve committee appointments and removals by majority vote. A
tax-payer suit, however, may be the only plausible way to create real change in the
committee system.129
A. All members of the General Assembly should be paid equally
As noted above, nearly all members of the General Assembly receive some
amount of supplemental compensation.130 What once may have been considered fair
to provide supplemental compensation for members serving in committee positions,
the need for such compensation is greatly diminished, if not rendered obsolete, by
the ever-increasing size of the committee system. When nearly all members are
required to perform some committee functions, the simple and logical fix is to pay
all members equally.131 This is the compensation structure in Congress.132
B. Require a majority vote to appoint and remove committee members
Further, the General Assembly should institute a rule requiring a majority vote of
the chamber to appoint and remove committee chairpersons. Such a rule redistributes
power to the elected representatives, allowing the peoples’ voice to be heard when
supplemental salary). Suppose this legislator has three young children and a wife who only
works part-time in order to care for their kids. This family lives in rural Ohio and comes from
modest means. The loss of his $10,000 supplemental salary would certainly be felt by this
family. As a result, this legislator must think long and hard before voting opposite the Speaker
on a controversial bill. Such considerations should never have to cross this legislator’s mind.
128

Solomon & Wolfensberger, supra note 107, at 321.

129

For a taxpayer suit to have standing, a removed committee chairperson would likely
have to join the suit as the lead plaintiff. Under Ohio’s common law, taxpayers must
demonstrate injury-in-fact different from the injury of a general taxpayer. A removed
committee chairperson would be able to demonstrate such an injury.
130
See supra Part II.A.2. All but twenty-six members of the one hundred thirty-twomember body serve in positions that receive supplemental compensation.
131

The simple solution would be to increase the base salary for legislators by $4,000. Such
an increase would reflect the additional work most members will perform at some point
during their term. $4,000 is also a rough weighted-average of the current supplemental salaries
being paid.
132

IDA S. BRUDNICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30064, CONGRESSIONAL SALARIES
ALLOWANCES 1 (2013).
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selecting the powerful “little legislatures.”133 The United States House and Senate
currently employ appointment mechanisms that incorporates chamber-wide
elections. In the Senate, committee members are appointed through party
caucuses.134 Members select their desired committee placements, and each parties’
conference then creates a roster of proposed committee placements to be put to a
vote.135 The House employs a similar appointment-process, with each party using a
“committee on committees” to prepare an assignment slate of prospective committee
members that must be submitted to the full chamber for approval.136
I propose that the Ohio General Assembly adopt a similar committee
appointment and removal process as that of Congress. The benefits of adopting such
a system would be two-fold. First, power will redistributed away from the leadership
and back to the chambers as wholes. No longer could the leadership unilaterally
quash committee debate by removing dissenting committee members. As a result,
proposed legislation will receive full and unadulterated debate, increasing the level
of deliberative democracy in the legislature.
Second, because of the term-limits placed on General Assembly legislators,
Ohio’s committee selection process will avoid the problems associated with
seniority-based selection that affects Congress. Congressional Seniority plays a large
133

WILSON, supra note 34.

134

Senate Committees, Chapter 3-Committee Membership, UNITED STATES SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Committees.htm#5 (last visited
Feb. 4, 2014).
135

Id.

[P]arty conferences convene before the start of each new Congress to elect leaders and
determine committee assignments. Each party conference appoints a “committee on
committees” to prepare a roster of members it wishes named to the party’s specifically
allotted committee seats. The percentage of a party’s representation within the Senate
determines the percentage of seats it will gain on each committee, although exact
numbers are subject to negotiation between party floor leaders.
Id.
136

Committee FAQS: How are the members of the standing committees selected?, OFFICE

OF THE CLERK UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://clerk.house.gov/

committee_info/commfaq.aspx.
Each of the two principle [sic] parties in the House is responsible for the assigning its
members to committees, and at the first stage, each party uses a committee on
committees to make the initial recommendations for assignments. At the beginning of
the new Congress, Members express preferences for assignment to the appropriate
committee on committees. Most incumbents prefer to remain on the same committees
so as not to forfeit expertise and committee seniority. These committees on
committees then match preferences with committee slots, following certain guidelines
designed in part to distribute assignments fairly. They then prepare and approve an
assignment slate for each committee, and submit all slates to the appropriate full party
conference for approval. Approval at this second stage often is granted easily, but the
conferences have procedures for disapproving recommended Members and
nominating others in their stead. Finally, at the third stage, each committee submits its
slate to the pertinent full Chamber for approval, which is generally granted.
Id.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss1/13

24

2014]

SUPPLEMENTAL PAY OR SUPPLEMENTAL POWER?

293

role in the selection of committee members and chairpersons. Incumbent
congressmen “prefer to remain on the same committees so as not to forfeit expertise
and committee seniority.”137 Seniority therefore heavily factors into the selection of
committee chairpersons.138 Some argue that as a result of seniority’s influence on
committee selections, constituents are deprived of a meaningful choice at the ballot
box because replacing a senior representative with a new face results in that district
losing its representative power on committee.139
Ohio will avoid these problems because state legislators are limited to a total of
eight years in the House and Senate.140 Therefore, senior legislators will not be able
to wholly subsume the power lost by the leadership. Instead, Ohio’s legislators will
have the opportunity to apportion the powers of committee membership as they see
fit. Considering Woodrow Wilson’s admonition of the power of committees141, it is
only proper that the peoples’ representatives be heard when selecting chairpersons.
The General Assembly needs to act on this problem now and not waste tax-payer
money litigating the issue later.
C. Tax-Payer suit challenging § 101.27(A)(4) may be the only plausible option
Striking down section 101.27(A)(4) is likely the only plausible route to
changing the committee compensation structure. The General Assembly is unlikely
to take up this issue itself. If history tells us anything, it is that those in power do not
let it go without a fight. Additionally, a change to the House rules requires a majority
of its members’ approval,142 and Senate rules require three-fifths of the elected
137

Id.

138

Dan Goldstein & Richard Scamell, Congressional Seniority
Representation: A Proposal for Reform, 51 TEX. L. REV. 722, 722 (1973).

and

Unequal

139
For a more thorough examination of this problem, see Id. at 723. “As their
representatives do not hesitate to emphasize, election of a challenger will necessarily result in
sacrifice of the incumbent’s seniority-based power. If voters wish powerful representation,
they must reelect the incumbent.”
140
The Term Limited States, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/chart-of-term-limits-states.aspx
(last
visited Feb. 6, 2014). For an argument that term-limits have actually hurt Ohio’s General
Assembly, see Darrel Rowland, Support for Ohio term limits vanishing, COLUMBUS DISPATCH
(Apr. 7, 2013), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2013/04/07/support-for-termlimits-vanishing.html. Opponents of term limits argue that the legislature loses power to the
executive branch because legislators are not around long enough to gain institutional memory,
whereas the members of the executive branch are not term limited. Id.

But a term-limited legislature has upset the balance of power in state government, the
Medina Republican said. ‘There’s no question that the governor and the cabinet
members have a ton more power than they did.’ Batchelder recalled how veteran
committee chairmen used to educate cabinet members, especially in more-technical
areas such as insurance and utilities. But now, it’s the appointed officials, not those
elected by the people, with the knowledge — and thus the power.
Id. (citation omitted).
141

WILSON, supra note 34.

142

Ohio House Rule 114.
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Senators to change.143 Neither chamber would be likely to achieve the necessary
votes to change the rules as such a proposal would experience extreme resistance
from General Assembly leaders and general members.144 Further, any legislative
change to committee compensation would require a bill to make it through the very
committees that General Assembly leaders exercise so much power over.145
Therefore, a tax-payer suit challenging the supplemental payment provision section
101.27(A)(4) may be the only way to correct the woes of Ohio’s committee
compensation structure.
V. UPHOLDING OHIO’S CONSTITUTION REQUIRES ACTION ON THE PART OF
OHIO’S CITIZENS
The Ohio General Assembly’s committee compensation structure must change if
the legislative body is to represent its citizens as envisioned by the Constitution’s
Framers. General Assembly leaders wield financial leverage over committee
chairpersons to shape legislation in the leaders’ favor. Allowing the leaders to
exercise their power in this manner defeats a key tenant of representative democracy:
that each citizen should be vigorously and independently represented by his or her
elected official. Ohio’s citizens are disserved when General Assembly political
maneuverings are given teeth in the form of financial leverage. The only winners
under the current compensation structure are the General Assembly leaders. Ohio

The rules of the House may be amended. A member who desires to amend the rules
shall prepare a resolution that sets forth the proposed amendment and file it with the
Clerk in a number of copies to be determined by the Clerk. The Speaker or presiding
officer shall announce the resolution at the next session of the House at which bills are
given third consideration, and shall refer the resolution to the Committee on Rules and
Reference. A majority of all members elected shall be required for the adoption of the
resolution.
Id.
143

Ohio Senate Rule 96.

These rules shall not be altered except after due notice of the intention of alteration;
and no rule shall be altered, except by a three-fifths vote of the senators elected. Any
of these rules may be suspended by a three-fifths vote of the members elected,
excepting rules which specifically require otherwise.
Id.
144

The argument could be made that general members and sitting chairpersons would favor
changing the rules to prohibit discretionary removals. But history seems to work against this
argument, as each chamber votes on these rules at the beginning of each session and no
change has ever been contemplated. Further, general members may favor the current system
because they have a greater probability of being appointed to a chairpersonship if the sitting
chairpersons can be removed at any time and replaced, rather than having to wait for the term
to end for any changes to be made.
145
Should such a bill be introduced in committee, the General Assembly leader can
exercise his power to remove the sitting chairperson and replace her with a chairperson that is
hostile to the idea of change. This type of maneuvering is exactly why the committee structure
must change; bills that are controversial or contrary to the interests of General Assembly
leaders are killed in committee without a full hearing of the issue.
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citizens must stand up and exercise their rights as taxpayers, should the General
Assembly unwisely fail to timely resolve this issue.
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